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Conclusion
If the aims of Congress in its current social legislation are
to be adequately effectuated, even further access to information
may be required. The census power has been suggested as a
constitutional basis for collecting data not obtainable otherwise,
as where the matter concerned is in the exclusive jurisdiction
of the states."0 The war power has been used effectively in the
past for the accomplishment of the same purpose.70
Although private persons are protected by the courts from
unreasonable demands for information, they must primarily rely
on the forbearance and discretion of the investigating body. Re-
cent studies show that administrative bodies are not abusing
their power.71 The present administrative agencies have had the
voluntary cooperation of the persons affected in the accumula-
tion of information.7 2 Moreover, some of them are now able to
make decisions and rules as occasion arises on the basis of in-
formation which has already been compiled.7 3 As a result, there
is little use of compulsory process.7 4
LEONARD E. MARTIN.
DELEGATION OF POWERS TO PRIVATE GROUPS
IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutionality of the delegation of public powers to
private groups and citizens is an important subject today, partly
because it often becomes necessary for the state to draft the
services of qualified individuals or groups to participate in the
exercise of public functions, and partly because these groups
ask for the power to govern themselves. This results from the
limited ability of officials to give adequate attention to all mat-
69. See United States v. Moriarity (C. C. A. 2, 1901) 106 Fed. 886, 891;
Rush, Expansion of Federal Supervision of Securities through the Inquisi-
tional Census Powers of Congress-A Suggestion (1937) 36 Mich. L. Rev.
409.
70. See United States v. Mulligan (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1920) 268 Fed.
893; Colclough, Security Exchange Commission's Power of Search (1935)
3 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 356.
71. See Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
Final Report (1941) cc. 3 and 7. Cf. Note, Legislative Investigations (1941)
9 1. J. A. Bul. 73.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 113.
74. See Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,
Final Report (1941) 414.
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ters demanding the state's regulation., Delegation of power fre-
quently has been made to administrative boards or officers
equipped to handle special, complex problems.2 Today, however,
by reason of the increasing scope and complexity of regulatory
powers, the delegation of public powers to private citizens or
groups is increasing. The Federal Government, without resort-
ing to the bestowal of legal regulatory power upon private
groups, in the National Industrial Recovery Act conferred upon
industrial and business groups the function of proposing codes
of fair competition which the President was authorized to
promulgate after hearings, with or without modification.3 The
preparation of these codes of fair competition was in the hands
of committees of industrial and business representatives; the
early drafts of the codes were prepared by these committees;
and in practical working effect their members were the only
ones who understood the intricacies and subtleties of the codes
and the motives behind them.4 Although the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act was declared unconstitutional upon other
grounds,5 the device of industrial committees consisting of pri-
vate persons has been perpetuated in later legislation. The Fair
Labor Standards Act of 19386 provides for industry committees
including an equal number of representatives of the public, the
employees, and the employers. These committees recommend to
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division "the highest
minimum wage rates for the industry which it determines, hav-
ing due regard to economic and competitive conditions, will not
substantially curtail employment in the industry." The Bitumi-
nous Coal Act of 19377 provides for twenty-three district boards
made up of code members who are to propose minimum prices.
Writers have forecast that with the growth of organized
groups in the professional and business fields, there will be an
extended use of these bodies in public administration. It has
been argued that unofficial bodies have always given consultant
service to the state and that there is reason to believe that they
can now wisely exercise limited public power.8 It has also been
1. See Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 80, 4 S. E. C. L. 536.
2. See Note (1925) Current Legislation 25 Col. L. Rev. 359; Cheadle,
The Delegation of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 Yale L. J. 893; Freund,
Administrative Powers Over Persons and Property (1928), ch. III.
3. (1933) 48 Stat. 195, c. 90, 15 U. S. C. A. secs. 701-712.
4. See Lyon, The National Recovery Administration (1935) c. V.
5. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 295 U. S. 495.
6. (1938) 52 Stat. 1060, c. 676, (1940 Supp.) 29 U. S. C. A. secs. 201-219.
7. (1937) 50 Stat. 72, c. 127, 15 U. S. C. A. secs. 828-851. See Jaffee,
Law Making by Private Groups (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201.
8. Chamberlain, Democratic Control of Administration (1927) 13 A. B.
A. J. 186, 4 S. E. C. L. 1460.
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argued that, with the changing character of the social structure,
the courts would not in this connection give strict construction to
the maxim: delegata potestas non potest delegar.0 This note
examines the problems of the delegability of public functions to
private persons and corporations in Missouri. 0
There are a number of relevant provisions in the Constitution
of Missouri and the Federal Constitution that bear upon this
problem. The sections in the Constitution of Missouri are: (1)
"The General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law:
* * *-(26) Granting to any corporation, association or individ-
ual any special or exclusive right, privilege or immunity, or to
any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down
a railroad track" ;" (2) "Taxes may be levied and collected for
public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same class
or subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying
the tax, and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general
law" ;12 (3) "The appointment of all officers not otherwise di-
rected by this Constitution shall be made in such manner as
may be prescribed by law" ;13 and (4) "The powers of govern-
ment shall be divided into three distinct departments-the legis-
lative, executive and judicial-each of which shall be confided to
a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons,
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belong-
ing to either of the others, except in the instances in this Con-
stitution expressly directed or permitted."'14 In the Federal
Constitution the due process clause of the XIVth Amendment is
relevant. It provides, inter alia: " * * nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
The following sections are concerned with the delegation of
power to private groups in the nominating and appointing of
public officers, the making of rules by private institutions, the
restricting of land use, the protesting of changes in zoning
ordinances, the enforcing of laws, the creating and enlarging of
franchises and the exercising of eminent domain.
9. Note (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1118; Note (1924) 10 Cornell L. J. 58.
10. The public powers discussed herein include those delegated by munici-
pal ordinances as well as those delegated by state statutes.
11. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. IV, sec. 53 (26).
12. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. X, sec. 3.
13. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. XIV, sec. 9.
14. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. III.
Washington University Open Scholarship
II. FILLING PUBLIC OFFICE
1. Nominating
One of the public functions that is frequently conferred upon
private groups, the delegation of which is usually upheld, is the
power to nominate to public office. In most instances, the nomi-
nating power is given to one or several private groups which
have a special interest in the proper filling of the offices for
which they suggest nominees. The treatment of this problem by
the Missouri Supreme Court, in the more recent cases, puts
Missouri with the minority of states which stand firm against
such delegation.1
When the question of the delegability of the nominating power
was before the Missouri Supreme Court for the first time, that
Court upheld the delegation. The State Barbers' Act of 1899,
applicable to all cities of more than 50,000 population, required
the governor to appoint a three-man Board of Barber Examiners,
one to be chosen from those recommended by the Missouri State
Barbers' Protective Association, one from those recommended
by the Boss Barbers' Protective Association, and one from those
recommended by the Journeymen Barbers' Union. 6 In an action
of habeas corpus to test the legality of the imprisonment of the
petitioner for practicing as a barber without a license from the
Board, the petitioner contended that the act was unconstitutional
because (1) the statutory method of appointment interfered
with the separation of powers between the executive and legis-
lative branches in that it constituted a partial exercise of the
appointing power by the legislature, and (2) the act failed ac-
tually to prescribe a method of appointment as required by the
Missouri Constitution, since it would fail to operate if the unions
refused to nominate. In Ex parte Lucas1 the act was held con-
stitutional, on the ground that the Constitution of Missouri left
the manner of appointing officers entirely to the legislature and
hence no constitutional powers of the Governor were infringed.
The legislature, by merely providing the manner and form and
stating the conditions precedent to the appointment of the board,
did as it was authorized to do.'$ The court said further that the
Governor alone could raise any constitutional objection on this
score.
Later, however, in State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn,19 the
15. Note (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 80, 89, 4 S. E. C. L. 536, 546.
16. Mo. Laws of 1899, 44.
17. (1901) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218.
18. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. XIV, sec. 9.
19. (1902) 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W. 592.
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Lucas case2° was distinguished. The legislature had provided for
boards of three election commissioners in cities having more
than 100,000 inhabitants, to be appointed by the Governor.
The act required that one member of the commission belong to
"the leading party politically opposed" to that to which the other
two members belonged. The minority member was to be chosen
from a list of three men named by the city central committee of
that party.21 In a quo warranto proceeding to test the right of
a minority member to his office, it appeared thai the Governor
had disregarded the nominations of the city central committee
and appointed the defendant. The foregoing provision of the act
was held unconstitutional as a special law granting to an associ-
ation an exclusive right, privilege, or immunity22 and the right
of the respondent to the office was confirmed. The Court said
further that the legislature had not merely prescribed the method
of appointment as authorized by the Constitution but had so
limited the Governor as in effect to exercise a large share of the
appointing function itself. The barber case 23 was distinguished
upon the ground that the legislature there did not confer a
"right, privilege or immunity" upon one organization that it did
not confer upon all, since there were no other organizations
of barbers existing in the state.
The efforts of the court to distinguish the Lucas case in State
ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn may be criticized. The line of dis-
tinction drawn on the right-privilege-immunity point was thin
and unrealistic, because it was obvious that other associations
of barbers might come into existence at any time. The Wash-
burn decision may also be criticised for its treatment of the
legislature's power to determine the method of making appoint-
ments. The Court there said that although the constitutional
provision authorizes the legislature to prescribe the manner in
which appointments should be made, it does not authorize the
appointment itself to be made by the legislature; for "To provide
by law the manner in which an appointment shall be made is one
thing, to make the appointment is another; the one is in its
nature legislative, the other is essentially executive. The con-
stitution authorizes the legislature to do the one, but not the
other."2 4 But the statutory provisions in the two cases are so
20. Ex parte Lucas (1901) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218.
21. Mo. Laws of 1899, 197.
22. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. IV, sec. 53(26).
23. Ex parte Lucas (1901) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218.
24. State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn (1902) 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W. 592,
595.
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much alike that there is no apparent reason for saying that one
infringes upon the Governor's power of appointment while the
other does not.
The sounder view was expressed by the court in the Lucas
case. Nevertheless, the Washburn case was followed in State
ex rel. Harvey v. Wright.25
The Non Partisan Court Plan adopted by an amendment to
the Constitution of Missouri at the general election of November,
1940,21 includes a delegation of power to members of the bar,
who nominate the lawyers on "The Appellate Judicial Commis-
sion" and "The Circuit Judicial Commission [s] ''27 of
the state. The Appellate Judicial Commission, which fills vacan-
cies on the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, is a seven-man
commission composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Missouri, one lawyer from each Court of Appeals District,
elected by the lawyers in that district, and one layman from
each Court of Appeals District, appointed by the Governor. Each
Circuit Judicial Commission is a five-man commission composed
of the presiding Judge of the Court of Appeals of the Judicial
Circuit, two lawyers elected by the lawyers in that circuit, and
two laymen residents of that circuit appointed by the Governor.
When the Governor fills a vacancy on the Supreme Court, the
Courts of Appeals, or the Circuit and Probate Courts of the City
of St. Louis and Jackson County, he appoints as judge one of
the three persons nominated and submitted to him by the appro-
priate non-partisan judicial commission. It is relevant to note,
however, that lawyers constitute an occupational group whose
members are officers of the court.
The drafters of the statute providing for the creation and
appointment of the Board of Pharmacy used a device which
leaves the Governor free to make his own appointments, while
putting considerable pressure on him, nevertheless, to follow the
recommendations of an interested private group. This statute
authorizes the Missouri Pharmaceutical Association to submit
25. (1913) 251 Mo. 325, 158 S. W. 823.
26. This amendment was submitted by initiative petition and adopted at
the general election, November 5, 1940, Thomas' Cumulated Annotated
Supplement to R. S. Mo. 1939 (1941) 9. The full text is also printed in
(1940) 11 Mo. B. J. 43.
27. Circuit Judicial Commissions are to be established for each judicial
circuit which is subject to the provisions of the amendment. The amend-
ment specifically applies to the circuit and probate courts within the City
of St. Louis and Jackson County. Provision is also made whereby a ma-jority of qualified voters of any judicial circuit may elect to have judges of
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a list of five pharmacists each year, from which the Governor
may appoint one to the State Board of Pharmacy. But the
Governor is empowered to select his appointee either from the
list submitted by the Association, "or from others.128
2. Appointing
In addition to the above instances of the nominating power,
there are two examples of the appointing power vested in private
institutions which perform services of public benefit. As no cases
have arisen on these examples, their provisions are set out with-
out any comment upon their constitutionality.
The first example concerns the vesting of the appointing power
in humane societies. The statute provides that in cities of the
first class where there is a humane society:
* * * it shall be the duty of the board of police commissioners
of such city to appoint one or more special officers, to be
recommended by such society, whose term of office and
wages shall be that of a regular policeman. * *2D
Thus, these private associations have public officers, paid from
public funds, wearing uniforms designed by these societies, and
exercising public powers, placed at their disposal for the more
effective prevention of cruelty to children and animals.
The second example is found in the membership of the Mis-
souri State Anatomical Board which consists of the
heads of departments of anatomy, professors and associate
professors of anatomy at the educational institutions of the
State * * * in which said educational institutions human
anatomy is investigated or taught: * 3o
In this instance, it seems that the legislature, primarily wanting
professors to fill public offices, was content to let the educational
institutions make the appointments. Nevertheless, it might be
argued that this appointing power is not consciously exercised
by the educational institutions, since they very probably would
not, in selecting men for their chairs, be moved by the realiza-
tion that they were at the same time filling a position on the
state board.
III. RULE MAKING POWER
1. By Private Institutions
The instances of the delegation of the rule making power to
private institutions are few. In two instances, in Missouri,
28 R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 10010.
29. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 6498. For an interesting case on the delegation
of the law enforcement power to a humane society, see Nicchia v. People
of New York (1920) 254 U. S. 228.
30. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 9998.
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state boards are directed by statute to adopt rules promulgated
by national professional groups. The dental board is bound, in
part, by the standards of one of these private associations; a
clause in the statute provides that the qualifications for approval
of a dental college by the Missouri Dental Board " * * shall in
nowise be less than the standard required by the American As-
sociation of Dental Schools." 31 The State Board of Health may
issue a license to practice medicine in Missouri to one who has a
certificate from the National Board of Medical Examiners of the
United States, chartered under the laws of the District of Co-
lumbia.32 The National Board of Medical Examiners, although
made up of state officials, is not itself an official body.
A third instance concerns a private professional institution.
In 1897 the legislature enacted that osteopathy "as taught and
practiced by the American school of osteopathy of Kirksville,
Missouri, is hereby declared not to be the practice of medicine
and surgery in the meaning of article I, ch. 59 and not subject to
provisions of said article." 33 Osteopaths are separately licensed.
In State v. Carlstrom,:4 a criminal charge was brought against
the defendant, a licensed osteopath, for practicing medicine with-
out a license because he issued a prescription. The defendant
filed a verified plea in abatement to the effect that the American
School of Osteopathy taught the use of medicine and prescriptions
in the osteopathic treatment of certain diseases and that the de-
fendant in writing this prescription was following the teachings
of the American School of Osteopathy. The state demurred to the
plea, but the trial court overruled the demurrer on the ground
that the state had admitted the legal sufficiency of the facts
pleaded by the defendant. On appeal, the state contended that
the clause "as taught and practiced by the American School of
Osteopathy" was valid only because it referred to the methods
of teaching and practicing osteopathy as they existed at the time
of the statute's enactment and, hence, did not confer the power
to make later changes upon the American School. But the Ap-
pellate Court, taking the same view as the trial court, said:
The plea in abatement alleged that the system of osteopathy
teaches and uses, and has always taught and used as a part
of its system, the particular drugs mentioned in the informa-
tion, and the demurrer admits it, so what was the trial court
to do but to sustain the plea in abatement?
35
31. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 10086.
32. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 9983.
33. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 10042.
34. (1930) 224 Mo. App. 439, 28 S. W. (2d) 691.
35. State v. Carlstrom (1930) 224 Mo. App. 439, 28 S. W. (2d) 691, 696.
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Thus the court sidestepped the issue of whether the legislature
could validly confer rule making power upon the American
School of Osteopathy. If the court should say today, in passing
upon this point, that the scope of the practicing of osteopathy
was to be determine by the most recent pronouncements of the
American School, it would thereby recognize a continuing rule
making power vested in a private institution.
A fourth instance of delegation of rule making power is found
in an act of 1895 providing that insurance companies doing busi-
ness in Missouri should agree upon a uniform form of fire in-
surance policy for use in the state, which form should be ap-
proved by the state insurance commissioner. 6
After sidestepping the issue in an early case,37 the court, in
the case of Nalley v. Home Insurance Company,38 held the statute
unconstitutional because the power of the insurance companies
and the commissioner to prepare any forms of policy they pleased
was legislative and hence not delegable. In this way, although
the scope of delegation, rather than delegation to private com-
panies, was the principal issue, an important instance of actual
bestowal of authority upon private companies was defeated.30
2. Waiver of Land Restrictions
It is within the usual police power of the state to restrict the
use of land. City ordinances prohibit specified uses of land in
the interest of the public peace, health, morals, or safety; but
many of these ordinances permit a waiver of restrictions upon
the consent of a designated proportion of the nearby property
owners.40 This type of consent provision has usually been sus-
tained upon the ground that it is necessary to guard against
harm to the value of neighboring land. 41 The Missouri courts,
however, have disagreed.
An ordinance of the City of St. Louis, which provided that
specified businesses could not be located on any city block in the
city without the written consent of the owners of one-half of
36. R. S. Mo. (1909) sec. 7030. The present fire insurance statute is
R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 5940.
37. Business Men's League v. Waddill (1898) 143 Mo. 495, 45 S. W. 262.
38. (1913) 250 Mo. 452, 157 S. W. 769.
39. See Patterson, The Insurance Commissioner in the United States
(1927) sec. 18(2), 248-258, reprinted from Patterson, Administrative Con-
trol of Insurance Policy Forms (1925) 25 Col. L. Rev. 253, 257-266.
40. See McBain, Law Making by Property Owners (1921) 36 Pol. Sci. Q.
617, 4 S. E. C. L. 518.
41. The leading "consent" cases, Cusack Co. v. Chicago (1917) 242 U. S.
526, Eubank v. Richmond (1912) 226 U. S. 137, and Seattle Title Trust Co.
v. Roberge (1928) 278 U. S. 116 are discussed by Jaffee, Law Making by
Private Groups (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 226-228.
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the ground on the block, was held invalid 2 as a delegation to
property owners of the power of the city to regulate the location
of businesses, thus giving rise to the possibility of discrimination.
This case reversed an earlier decision holding the ordinance valid
as a proper exercise of the police power with respect to health.43
Some time thereafter an ordinance of the City of Poplar Bluff,
to the effect that no wooden building could be erected within the
fire limits of the town without the consent of all the property
owners in the block, was held invalid4" on the grounds that the
ordinance was in violation of the statute authorizing the council
of a third class city to establish fire limits by ordinance; that
since the legislature could not pass any local or special law
granting a right, privilege, or immunity to any person, the legis-
lature could not give a city the right to do so; and that the terms
of the ordinance amounted to a delegation of the legislative
power of a city to the property owners of the city block. But an
ordinance of the City of St. Louis that no hack or cab drivers
could be licensed to have their stands on streets without the
written consent of the abutting property owners was held con-
stitutional upon the ground that it merely afforded the abutting
owners a means of protecting their rights of ingress and egress. 45
There was no discussion of the possible delegation of legislative
powers to the property owners.
Under the former dramshop law, it was mandatory upon the
county court or other authority to grant licenses in cities of
more than 2,000 population when a proper petition, signed by
two thirds of the assessed taxpaying citizens in the block where
the dramshop was to be located, was presented. 46 The validity
of the statute was not challenged.4 7
3. Zoning Laws
Under the state zoning enabling act,4 8 all incorporated towns,
cities, and villages may enact zoning ordinances to establish
comprehensive regulation of the use of land.49 Under the act, if
42. City of St. Louis v. Russell (1893) 116 Mo. 248, 22 S. W. 470
(livery stable); accord: City of St. Louis v. Howard (1893) 119 Mo. 41,
24 S. W. 770 (slaughter house).
43. State ex rel. Russell v. Beattie (1884) 16 Mo. App. 131.
44. Hays v. City of Poplar Bluff (1915) 263 Mo. 516, 173 S. W. 676.
45. McFall v. City of St. Louis (1911) 232 Mo. 716, 135 S. W. 51.
46. R. S. Mo. (1899) sec. 2997. This statute was repealed in 1931, Mo.
Laws of 1931, 266.
47. At the present time, an applicant for a liquor license must meet the
requirements of the Liquor Control Act, R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 4874 et seq.
48. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 7412 et seq.
49. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 7412.
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an ordinance has gone into effect, and if a later proposed change
in any regulation, restriction, or boundary produces a protest
against the change signed by 10 per cent. of the property owners
affected by the change or located within 186 feet of the land in-
volved, it is provided that "such amendment shall not become
effective except by the favorable vote of three-fourths of all
members of the legislative body of the municipality."50 As a
practical matter, the protest by 10 per cent. of the property
owners confers a limited veto power upon them.
Under this act, a Kansas City ordinance was adopted, dividing
the city into seven use districts. No specific provision had been
made for the location of charitable institutions. The plaintiff
association, wishing to locate a home for the aged in a residen-
tial district, in a residence bequeathed to it, had its application
granted by the board of zoning appeals; but after a protest of
10 per cent. of the property owners the plaintiff received only a
bare majority vote of the city's Common Council and not the
three-fourths required by the statute. In the federal district
court, the plaintiff urged that the alleged delegation of legislative
authority to the property owners violated the United States Con-
stitution, but the court held that the "fact that the legislative
body may heed the voice of protest is not a delegation of legisla-
tive authority."5' 1 The court further said that such a provision
merely affected "the enforcement of laws and ordinances." In
the circuit court of appeals, the case was reversed and remanded
upon other grounds.52
IV. LAW ENFORCEMENT
The rights of private persons to arrest in order to prevent the
commission of a felony and, at times, to kill a person in the act
of committing a felony do not depend upon the delegation of
these powers by the legislature.53 Statutes may, however, en-
courage the cooperation of private individuals in the enforcement
of criminal laws. As an example, under a former act making it
a misdemeanor to fail to ring the bell on a railroad engine at
least 80 rods from an intersection and to keep it ringing, an
informer who induced a successful prosecution received one-half
50. R. S. Mo. (1939) sec. 7416.
51. Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, Mo. (D. C.
W. D. Mo. 1931) 54 Fed. (2d) 1071.
52. Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Soc. v. Kansas City, Mo. (C. C. A.
8, 1932) 58 Fed. (2d) 593.
53. 1 Wharton's Cqiminal Law (12th Ed. 1932) 512, sec. 383.
54. R. S. Mo. (1879) sec. 806.
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of the $20.00 penalty.r, Another method of permitting the use
of public power, rather than bringing about cooperation, is to
give to a private association the power to maintain officers with
the authority to apprehend and arrest lawbreakers. This device
was used in the special charter incorporating the Union Ceme-
tery Association of Kansas City, which provided for the appoint-
ment of a bailiff who was authorized to make arrests and take
offenders before the officer or tribunal having cognizance of
specified offenses mentioned in the other sections of the charter.
His appointment was to be confirmed by the County Court of
Jackson County.-
V. ENLARGING OR CREATING A FRANCHISE
The era of special legislative enactments for the creation of
private corporations has been terminated by state constitutional
provisions which prohibit the granting of such special charters.5 7
The Missouri Constitution has contained such a prohibition since
1865.-- In a prior instance, when the legislature created the Mis-
souri Petroleum Company by special charter,5 the company was
given the power, inter alia, to market special stock which formed
no part of the general stock of the company. The holders of such
special stock were permitted to become a distinct corporation.
In this manner, the Missouri Zinc Company was organized. In
an action on some notes signed by the zinc company and its
president, the plaintiff holder alleged that since the zinc company
was not a legally organized corporation, it was a partnership and
therefore Richards, who signed the notes as its president, was
liable as a partner. Without discussing what would be an un-
lawful delegation of the legislative power to grant a franchise,
the Court held that the zinc company was legally organized
and that the power of the Missouri Petroleum Company to
market and issue this special stock was not such a delegation of
55. See State ex rel. Clay Co. v. Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co. (1886) 89
Mo. 562, 1 S. W. 130; State ex rel. Cass County v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1899)
149 Mo. 104, 50 S. W. 278.
56. This provision in their special charter was mentioned in Union
Cemetery Ass'n v. Kansas City (1913) 252 Mo. 466, 161 S. W. 261. It is
of interest today to note that the Model Sabotage Prevention Act provides
that "any person employed as watchman, guard, or in a supervisory ca-
pacity" on the fenced-in grounds of a business engaged in the production,
storage, or transportation of defense materials may stop any person, inter-
rogate him, and "arrest such person without warrant" for unlawful entry
on property. Werner, The Model Sabotage Prevention Act (1941) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 602.
57. See Frey, Cases and Statutes on Business Associations (1935) p. 54.
58. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. XII, sec. 2.
59. Mo. Sess. Laws of 1865, 268.
1941] NOTES
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/11
552 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
legislative power as would invalidate the formation of the Mis-
souri Zinc Company and thus turn it into a partnership.00 It
would seem that the power to form new corporations is clearly
legislative, however, and should not be placed in private hands
without official supervision.
A similar question arose in a recent decision involving a
statute which provided that not less than three nor more than
seven qualified electors could become a corporate body as state
highway toll bridge trustees by filing articles of agreement with
the Secretary of State.61 Such a body was declared to be an
agency of the state, with power to erect a toll bridge and issue
tax-free revenue bonds to meet the cost of construction. After
the indebtedness was paid off, the bridge was to be free and title
was to vest in the state. In an action of mandamus to compel the
Secretary of State to file articles of agreement tendered by the
relators under this act, the act was declared unconstitutional (1)
as an attempted delegation to private citizens of the power to
create a public agency and (2) as an attempted exemption of
private property from taxation.62
VI. EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain raises no particular constitutional problems
when private corporations, organized and incorporated by a
special charter6 3 or under general statutes, 4 or foreign corpora-
tions65 exercise the power, if the private property is taken for a
public use and if a proper remedy is provided for property
owners to obtain compensation.66 But at the same time, it should
be recognized that the invocation of the statutory procedure of
eminent domain is a benefit-a right, privilege, or immunity-a
property right that other people or groups cannot get from the
state.
60. Granby Mining & Smelting Co. v. Richards (1888) 95 Mo. 106, 8
S. W. 246.
61. Mo. Sess. Laws of 1935, 337, Mo. St. Ann. 1929 (1940 Supp.) 6786,
secs. 7914d-7914g.
62. The bridge from a property tax and the interest on the bonds from
a state income tax. State ex rel. Jones v. Brown (1936) 338 Mo. 448, 92
S. W. (2d) 718.
63. North Missouri Ry. Co. v. Gott (1857) 25 Mo. 540; Cape Girardeau
and Scott County Macadamized Road Co. v. Dennis (1878) 67 Mo. 438.
64. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. of Missouri v. St. Louis I. M. &
S. Ry. Co. (1907) 202 Mo. 656, 101 S. W. 576, State ex rel. Greffet v.
Williams (1910) 227 Mo. 32, 127 S. W. 52.
65. Southern Ill. & Mo. Bridge Co. v. Stone (1903) 174 Mo. 1, 73 S. W.
453, 63 L. R. A. 301.
66. Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. McCooey (1917) 273 Mo. 29, 200 S. W. 59,
'Valther v. Warner (1857) 25 Mo. 277.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the dearth of litigation in Missouri on the
question of delegation of powers to private groups, one might
hazard the generalization that such delegation is not currently
favored in this state. The courts have definitely disapproved
delegation in the nominating of public officers, in the standard-
izing of the form of fire insurance policies, in the waiver of land
restrictions, and in the forming of toll bridge corporations. In
several cases, the issue of delegation was present, but the de-
cisions were placed on other grounds. Thus, no definite con-
clusion is possible concerning the statutory definition of osteop-
athy and concerning delegation of the power to property own-
ers to protest changes in zoning ordinances. In the majority of
instances when there has been statutory delegation, there has
been no litigation. Constitutional change has in one instance,
that of the Non-partisan Court Plan, created a delegation of
power to private groups; while in another instance, that of the
abolition of private incorporation, it has eliminated such dele-
gation. With the exception of the Lucas case, which was greatly
weakened by the Washburn case, the courts have not actually
approved a delegation of power to private groups. It is believed
that a more realistic recognition of the contributions specialized
private groups could make to governmental functioning, and of
the value derived from democratically permitting limited groups,
as in the zoning and land restriction instances, to decide ques-
tions concerning their interests, when only those interests are
affected, would lead to a wider acceptance of the delegation of
powers to private groups.
EDwARD A. DuBINsKY
1941] NOTES
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss4/11
